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THE NEW  MULTILATERAL PROCESS FOR THE BTWC: 
AMBIGUITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
 
by Nicholas A Sims†  
 
Introduction 
 
1.  This Briefing Paper examines the new multilateral process agreed at the Fifth Review 
Conference and identifies some ambiguities and uncertainties within the process in order to 
bring out the opportunities that these ambiguities provide to the States Parties to make 
progress in strengthening the BTWC regime.  Such a strengthening is all the more urgently 
required following the failure of the Fifth Review Conference to agree a Final Declaration 
and thereby carry forward the extended understandings which have played a central part in the 
construction of the BTWC regime. 
 
2.  The new process is to be "qualitatively different" from the review process which preceded 
it.   That claim was made repeatedly by Ambassador Tibor Toth, President of the Fifth 
Review Conference, during the Review Conference and in the Western Group Statement1 of 
14 November 2002 it is spelled out as follows:  "The decision that we have just adopted 
provides for a qualitatively different outcome to that found in the final products of previous 
Review Conferences." [Emphasis added] 
 
3.  The new process is detailed in paragraph 18 of the Final Document2 of the Fifth Review 
Conference which states that: 
 
18.  At its eighth plenary meeting on 14 November 2002, the Conference decided by 
consensus, as follows: 
 
(a) To hold three annual meetings of the States parties of one week duration each 
year commencing in 2003 until the Sixth Review Conference, to be held not later than 
the end of 2006, to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective 
action on: 
 
i.  The adoption of necessary, national measures to implement the prohibitions 
set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation; 
 
ii.  National mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight 
of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins; 
 
                                                 
† Nicholas A. Sims is a Reader in International Relations in the Department of International Relations at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, Houghton Street, London  WC2A  
2AE, UK. 
1Western Group, Statement on Behalf of the Western Group, Note by the President, BWC/CONF.V/16, 18 
November 2002.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
2United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November - 7 December 2001 and 11 - 22 November 2002, Final Document, 
BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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iii.  Enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or 
suspicious outbreaks of disease; 
 
iv.  Strengthening and broadening national and international institutional 
efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and 
combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants; 
 
v.  The content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. 
 
(b) All meetings, both of experts and of States Parties, will reach any conclusions or 
results by consensus. 
 
(c) Each meeting of the States Parties  will be prepared by a two week meeting of 
experts.  The topics for consideration at each annual meeting of the States Parties will 
be as follows:  items i and ii will be considered in 2003, items iii and iv in 2004 , item 
v in 2005.  The first meeting will be chaired by a representative of the Eastern Group, 
the second by a representative of  the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States, and the 
third by a representative of the Western Group. 
 
(d)  The meetings of experts will prepare factual reports describing their work. 
 
(e) The Sixth Review Conference will consider the work of these meetings and decide 
on further work. [Emphasis added] 
 
4.  A key element in the chapeau to the list of five topics in paragraph 18 (a) of the Final 
Report is the phrase "promote common understanding and effective action."   The hope of the 
proponents of the new process is that it will generate "effective action".  If it does so, then it 
will be "qualitatively different" in the sense of better.  On the other hand, if the new process 
leads to fragmentation of the overall treaty regime, it will be "qualitatively different" in the 
sense of worse. 
 
5. However, if it merely promotes "common understanding" and nothing more, it will serve 
much the same function as the Review Conferences in their fundamental role of recording 
where consensus has been reached on extended understandings of the implications of the 
BTWC.  There is nothing "qualitatively different" about that. 
 
6.  The new process for the BTWC will stand or fall primarily by: 
 
a.  its success in promoting common understanding AND 
 
b.  its success in promoting effective action; 
 
and also, informally but importantly, by 
 
c.  its ability to achieve sharper focus on key BTWC topics whilst maintaining the 
integrity and cohesion of the overall treaty regime AND 
 
d.  its cumulative effect in steering the BTWC towards a resumption of the review 
process proper in 2006. 
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'Reports', 'conclusions' and ' results': "many ambiguities" 
 
7.  Paragraph 18 (d) makes it clear that the two-week meetings of experts "will prepare 
factual reports" and paragraph 18 (b) that both the meetings of experts and the meetings of 
States Parties may produce "conclusions or results".  The latter, in the case of the annual 
meetings of States Parties, were interestingly glossed as "to take decisions" in the FCO notes 
appended to the UK Foreign Secretary's statement3 of 14 November 2002 welcoming the 
outcome.  However, it is not clear precisely what authority the "conclusions or results" will 
possess although it is evident that "conclusions or results" agreed by the States Parties will 
not be without authority. 
 
8.  The rule of consensus is to be absolute (as it was in the Ad Hoc Group of 1995-2001 and 
its VEREX predecessor of 1992-1993).  So there is to be no voting on "conclusions or 
results" at either kind of meeting or on the experts' "factual reports".  Rule 28 apart, the 
Rules of Procedure of the Fifth Review Conference seem likely to be applied mutatis 
mutandis to the meetings of States Parties and, presumably, to the meetings of experts. 
 
9.  The consensus rule still leaves uncertain what is to be the status of consensually-agreed 
"conclusions" issued by a meeting of States Parties in 2003, 2004 or 2005.  Although this 
flexibility could prove to be an advantage, equally care needs to be taken to avoid it leading 
to disarray.   Because of the failure of the Fifth Review Conference to adopt its own Final 
Declaration or to say anything about the four preceding Final Declarations, the "conclusions" 
of the new process will issue into a vacuum, at least until the Sixth Review Conference 
incorporates them into its Final Declaration in 2006.  Quite how much of a vacuum this is, 
will depend on the drafting of the conclusions.  If they are drafted so as to use language which 
clearly reaffirms and develops the content of previous Final Declarations, their relevance and 
value to the cumulative process of regime construction will be evident.  If they are regarded 
as "decisions" from the moment they are issued by a meeting of States Parties they may also 
be regarded as possessing the same status of politically-binding commitments as the Final 
Declaration of a Review Conference. This, however, seems unlikely given the provision in 
paragraph 18 (e) that "The Sixth Review Conference will consider the work of these meetings 
and decide on further work."   No wonder the Statement4 on behalf of the Group of the Non-
Aligned Movement and Other States -- the 'NAM Statement' --  noted that "The language of 
the decision has many ambiguities,...". However, as that NAM Statement went on to say "... 
but that we believe that as we move away from the climate and pressures of this Conference 
the need for the States Parties to be practical will ensure that the required work is done and 
that the ambiguities are clarified." 
 
10.  It is also left uncertain how the "factual reports" from the meetings of experts will relate 
to the "conclusions or results".   An obvious -- but imperfect -- model from the history of the 
BTWC could be the VEREX process, where the Ad Hoc Group of 1992-1993 produced a 
factual report on potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint, 
and that report was then transmitted to the States Parties meeting in the Special Conference of 
1994 to translate its findings into political terms and to propel its subject-matter higher up the 
diplomatic agenda. 
                                                 
3Jack Straw, Straw welcomes outcome of Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, 14 November 
2002.  Available at http://www.fco.gov.uk 
4Non-Aligned Movement and Other States, Statement on Behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other 
States, Note by the President, BWC/CONF.V/15, 18 November 2002.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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11.  This model is imperfect because VEREX and the 1994 Special Conference were 
explicitly part of a cumulative strengthening process for the BTWC, with no fixed limit in 
time;  whereas the possibility of any multilateral follow-up to the two-week meeting of 
experts and the one-week meeting of States Parties on each topic (in 2005) or pair of topics 
(in 2003 and 2004) prior to the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 is unlikely to be accepted 
by the United States.  From the US point of view, it seems clear that the concession of 3 x 3 
weeks for multilateral meetings in 2003-2005 is just that: a concession, setting a maximum 
not a minimum, and a maximum which must not be exceeded for fear of inflaming the anti-
multilateralists.  Another difference is that the one-week meetings of States Parties were 
agreed unconditionally by the Fifth Review Conference, unlike the Special Conference of 
1994 which the Third Review Conference agreed only conditionally: it was left5, in 1991, 
subject to majority requisition after consideration of the eventual VEREX report.  
Nevertheless some of the VEREX precedents may be applicable to the new process, in terms 
of the relationship between the meetings of experts and the meetings of States Parties. 
 
12.  The only other possible model from the history of the BTWC is the Ad Hoc Meeting of 
Scientific and Technical Experts which took place from 31 March to 15 April 1987 as an 
"appendix" to the Second Review Conference.  That meeting was mandated6 "to finalize the 
modalities for the exchange of information and data" under the particular set of cooperative 
measures which soon came to be known as Confidence-Building Measures, and were later to 
be enhanced and expanded at the Third Review Conference in 1991.  But the 1987 meeting 
was appointed to complete the work of the Second Review Conference.  It was largely 
concerned with working out the detail of the reporting forms to be used by States Parties, and 
the timing of implementation.  It operated within the limits of decisions already taken in 1986 
over which CBMs were, and which were not, ready for adoption at that time.  The meetings 
of experts in 2003, 2004 and 2005 on the other hand will be preparing7 for the meetings of 
States Parties corresponding to their respective topics or pairs of topics.  They will be 
preparatory;  the 1987 meeting was final. 
 
The new process: individual components each year 
 
13.  For each of the five topics, ambiguities and opportunities remain over: 
 
-  the nature and origin of the texts to be worked on; 
 
-  the shape of the drafting process; 
 
-  the relationship between the 'experts' and 'States Parties' levels of  consideration; 
                                                 
5United Nations, Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 9 - 27 September 1991, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.III/23, 1992, Part II, p.18, Article 
V section.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
6United Nations, Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.II/13/II, 1986, p.6, Article V section.  Available at 
http://www.opbw.org 
7United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November - 7 December 2001 and 11 - 22 November 2002, Final Report, 
BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002, paragraph 18c.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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-  how the pairings of topics (i) and (ii) in 2003, and of topics (iii) and (iv) in 2004, 
work out in terms of hours allocated to each, and whether they are addressed 
concurrently or consecutively, at the two-week meetings of experts and at the one-
week meetings of States Parties; 
 
-  the authority of any 'conclusions or results' and whether they constitute decisions or 
not, and if so whether they are to be regarded as comparable in status to the 
politically-binding commitments agreed in Final Declarations of Review Conferences; 
 
- how they fit into the cumulative process of regime construction, by using language 
which clearly reaffirms and develops the content of previous Final Declarations. 
 
-  the possibility of any collective follow-up on any topic before 2006: this appears 
unlikely to be accepted by the United States as it may be viewed as exceeding the 
maximum 3 x 3 weeks' allocation of time to the BTWC multilateral process between 
2003 and 2005. 
 
14.  It is apparent that much will depend on the preparations made by the States Parties for 
each of the annual meetings.   As Ambassador Tóth has stressed, the process could become an 
empty shell if States Parties do not engage and prepare in advance of first the expert meeting 
and then the meeting of States Parties.  Each State Party needs to consider the benefits that 
the individual topic can bring to the security, health, environment and prosperity of that State 
Party as well as to the international community and thus to work out how best to maximise 
and achieve those benefits.   There is little doubt about the need for each of the topics to be 
considered but it is far from clear as to how this can best be achieved -- and this may vary 
from State Party to State Party.  It is equally clear that the consideration of each topic can 
bring benefits to each State Party -- and that these can be maximised through prior 
preparation and analysis. 
 
15.  A possible model, at least for the 2003 topics, might look like this.  The meeting of 
experts could be essentially a pooling of experience and a comparison of best practice.  The 
texts to be worked on would be States Parties' legislation, regulations and other measures of 
BTWC national implementation, for topic (i), and the equivalent in respect of national 
mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic 
microorganisms and toxins, for topic (ii).  However, for this to be possible, it is clear that 
States Parties need to provide their legislation, regulations and other measures of BTWC 
national implementation prior to the experts meeting. 
 
16.  The secretariat can do much prior to the experts meeting to facilitate the best use of this 
material by arranging it in the most convenient format, with summaries and tabulations as 
appropriate, for ease of comparison as well as arranging for the necessary translation into the 
official UN languages.  Being a secretariat, however, it will quite properly refrain from 
making any judgements. 
 
17.  It would be for the meeting of experts to bring its collective judgement to bear on the 
material.  Its factual report would aim to add value by deriving recommendations for best 
practice from this pooling of experience. 
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18.  The meeting of States Parties would receive this factual report, including these 
recommendations, a few months later.  (5 September to 10 November 2003 appears to be the 
most likely interval, although at the time of writing only 10-14 November for the meeting of 
States Parties has been agreed.)  Governments of States Parties would accordingly have had 
time to consider the experts' report and recommendations beforehand and to identify the key 
issues which remained to be considered. 
 
19.  Carefully avoiding any suggestion of negotiation -- for the United States' insistence on 
keeping negotiation out of the new multilateral process is itself non-negotiable -- the meeting 
of States Parties could work on a different kind  of text from the meeting of experts for the 
purpose of recording its "conclusions or results".  Such a text would ideally integrate  
 
a.   the States Parties' verdict on the experts' recommendations, commending those it 
felt able to approve as promoting best practice,  
 
 and 
 
b.  the relevant language in Final Declarations, arranged and tabulated by the 
secretariat for the meetings of experts and of States Parties.  
 
20.  An integration exercise along these lines will be essential for making sure that the new 
multilateral process carries forward the stalled review process, admittedly in a different form 
and with a restricted agenda, but in a way which makes it easier rather than harder for the 
Sixth Review Conference to relaunch the review process proper in 2006. 
 
21.  The "conclusions or results" would possess at least a provisional authority, pending their 
full integration into the Final Declaration of the Sixth Review Conference.  At that point they 
would take their place within the overall framework of the review process, and its cumulative 
expression of common understandings, applied to the BTWC treaty regime in its entirety. 
 
22.  The new multilateral process could come to be seen in retrospect, on this scenario, as a 
well-focussed and intensive preparatory stage for the Sixth Review Conference, within the 
five-topics limit and bearing in mind that the five topics do not represent the full scope of the 
2006 agenda. 
 
The new process: interactions over the three years 
 
23.  Ambassador Tóth at the resumed Fifth Review Conference in 2002 placed great 
emphasis on the care he had taken to balance 'compliance' and 'cooperation' elements in 
formulating the five topics to be addressed in the new process.  It is vital to confidence in the 
process that most States Parties should share this perception of balance at the outset, and 
should remain convinced of it at the end.  Likewise, in considering the topics first in expert 
and then at the States Parties meetings, it will be important to recognise and address both 
'compliance' and 'cooperation' aspects of each topic.  Ambassador Tóth may well need to 
reiterate at intervals how carefully he selected the five topics in 2002, on criteria which 
included that of striking a  balance between the 'compliance' and 'cooperation' emphases of 
the different Groups. 
 
24.  The scope for interaction between one year and the next appears to be very restricted as 
each year's 2 + 1 weeks of meetings are seen as independent of each other year's.  They stand 
alone.  That is the formal position and it is likely to be championed vigorously by those who 
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fear any erosion of the formal position may give the United States an excuse for abandoning 
the whole process. 
 
25.  Yet, informally, it is going to be difficult to prevent tensions and confrontations -- for 
example, between the United States and the more anti-US members of the NAM -- spilling 
over from 2003 to 2004, and from 2004 to 2005.  Conversely, if the 2003 meetings go well 
there may be lessons to be applied, and precedents to be repeated, in 2004 and 2005.  At the 
very least, an outcome deemed reasonably successful in November 2003, when work on 
topics (i) and (ii) is concluded, will generate confidence in the process and States Parties will 
approach the 2004 meetings with less uncertainty and trepidation than if the 2003 meetings 
go badly. 
 
26.  By 2005 a certain amount of informal momentum may have built up, even though the 
process is emphatically not designed to be a cumulative one from year to year (unlike the 
review process proper).  It may be significant that 2005 has just one topic, not two, for 
attention; and it may be that a little time will be found and allocated to a more general 
stocktaking as the process nears its conclusion.  Another feature of the single 2005 topic, "the 
content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists", is that it is evidently 
the most distinctively 'non-governmental' in character of all five topics.  It is likely to require 
rather different treatment, at any rate in the two-week meeting of experts, from the more 
conventionally 'governmental' topics (i) to (iv) of 2003 and 2004. 
 
27.  Interaction between the meetings of 2003, 2004 and 2005 in a constructive sense would 
be made easier if a 'troika' of Chairmen were to coordinate the process.  Yet this currently 
seems a faint prospect.  At present, in addition to the likely US suspicion of anything which 
might mitigate the stand-alone character of each year's meetings, there appears to be some 
NAM opposition to any 'troika' arrangement.  However, in practice it is difficult to imagine 
that the NAM representative chairing the 2004 meetings will not have informal contact with 
Ambassador Toth who is chairing the 2003 meetings (having been appointed8 by the Fifth 
Review Conference on 14 November 2002 on the nomination of the Eastern Group) and with 
the eventual Western Group nominee to chair the 2005 meetings.  This still falls far short of a 
specially designed coordinating mechanism. 
 
28.  In the absence of a 'troika', formal or informal, let alone a Committee of Oversight for the 
duration of the process, much of the residual responsibility for coordination will rest with the 
Depositary Governments -- who are already wrestling with the dates of the 2003 meetings -- 
with the assistance of the secretariat provided by the UN Department for Disarmament 
Affairs through its Geneva Branch. 
 
29.  The Depositary Governments' mandate from the Fifth Review Conference9 is very 
limited: "The Conference requested the Depositaries of the Convention to consult with a view 
to establishing suitable dates for the 2003 meetings, and to notify States Parties 
accordingly."  Anything further that they are able to agree on among themselves to guide the 
                                                 
8United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November - 7 December 2001 and 11 - 22 November 2002, Final Report, 
BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002, paragraph 19.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
9United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November - 7 December 2001 and 11 - 22 November 2002, Final Report, 
BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002, paragraph 19.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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process will be derived instead from a broad understanding of the responsibilities conferred 
on them by Article XIV of the Convention in the light of the law of treaties, and subject 
always to what the States Parties generally will accept.  It cannot be taken for granted that the 
Depositary Governments will steer the process in substance as well as in timetabling the 
meetings. 
 
30.  On the other hand, the secretariat provided by the United Nations is required10 "to 
continue to assist the Depositary governments to provide such services as may be required 
for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Review Conferences."  
This could imply the beginnings of a bureau for the new multilateral process.  In any case the 
secretariat is likely to perform a vital role throughout and in particular prior to the annual 
meetings of experts, both in continuity over the successive years of the process as a whole, 
and during the individual meetings.  For these it should be reinforced as necessary by 
professional assistants recruited on short-term contracts, as has been the practice at both 2001 
and 2002 sessions of the Fifth Review Conference and earlier in the Ad Hoc Group 
secretariat. 
 
The new process and the Sixth Review Conference 
 
31.  The NAM Statement11 of 14 November 2002 included as its fourth 'understanding' that: 
 
"The BWC forms a composite whole and that while it is possible to address related 
issues separately, it will be necessary for all of the inter-linked elements of the 
Convention -- whether they relate to regulation, compliance or promotion -- to be 
dealt with." 
 
This strong affirmation of the need to address the Convention in the round reflects NAM 
disappointment at the selectivity of the 2003-2005 agenda.  It may also reflect a fear of 
fragmentation: a sharper focus on individual topics may be achieved only at the cost of 
neglecting the unity of the treaty regime as "a composite whole".  However, the decision to 
confine the new process to just five topics has been taken and the agenda cannot now be 
widened until 2006, although constructive use of the ambiguities in the language describing 
the five topics can potentially widen the bounds of discussion.  
 
32.  Accordingly, the relationship between the new process and the Sixth Review Conference 
raises further questions.  It will be essential to restore in 2006 the review process proper.  
This includes, in accordance with Article XII, an obligation to review the operation of the 
Convention in relation to the purposes of the Convention, and to review it in the round.  
Many important aspects of the Convention will have been excluded from systematic 
multilateral consideration ever since 2001 because of the self-imposed constraints of the Fifth 
                                                 
10United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Estimated Costs of Meetings in 2003, 2004 and 2005 of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
and on their Destruction: Note by the Secretariat, BWC/CONF.V/14, 13 November 2002, paragraph 1, citing 
decision 56/414 adopted by the UN General Assembly on 29 November 2001.  The plural Conferences is 
justified by the continuing requirement to implement unfulfilled or only partially fulfilled decisions and 
recommendations of the Second, Third and Fourth Review Conferences, in addition to the single decision of the 
Fifth Review Conference. 
11Non-Aligned Movement and Other States, Statement on Behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other 
States, Note by the President, BWC/CONF.V/15, 18 November 2002.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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Review Conference at its resumed session and because of the limitations it imposed on the 
new process.  It will be vital in the preparations for 2006 to ensure that the agenda of the 
Sixth Review Conference is not skewed by the input it receives from the 2003-2005 meetings 
of experts and meetings of States Parties.  The Conference in 2006 is indeed meant to 
"consider the work of these meetings and decide on any further action" 12 but care needs to be 
taken to ensure that its agenda must not be narrowed down to that input alone. 
 
33.  Deliberate efforts will have to be made to ensure attention in 2006 to all the other aspects 
of the Convention as well.  This will require intensive rounds of consultation in 2005-06, 
especially if the United States does not allow any part of the 2005 meeting of States Parties to 
be used for broadening out the discussion beyond topic (v), codes of conduct for scientists, to 
a wider stocktaking.  Consultations may well need to take place in the margins of the First 
Committee in New York during October and November 2005 although this may be difficult 
as the Presidency of the Sixth Review Conference is unlikely to have been agreed until the 
Preparatory Committee usually held in April prior to the Review Conference.  There is much 
to be said for the Preparatory Committee for the Sixth Review Conference taking place 
immediately after the meeting of the States Parties in 2005, rather than being left until April 
2006.  Then the President-designate could undertake successive rounds of consultations with 
individual States Parties and the Eastern, NAM and Western Groups  -- as the President of 
the Fifth Review Conference did in April, July and September 2002 -- as well as using the 
First Committee opportunities in the autumn of 2005.  
 
34.  Otherwise, there is a danger that the Sixth Review Conference will open in 2006 with 
unresolved disagreement over whether -- to put it at its simplest -- it is aiming to build on the 
review process of 1980-86-91-96, or on the new process of 2003-05, or on a mixture of the 
two processes.  (For this purpose, the Fifth Review Conference of 2001-02 is regarded as a 
hiatus, having failed to consolidate let alone carry forward the review process.) 
 
Contextual influences on the new process 
 
35.  The new process will be influenced by other things happening in the world with regard to 
the threat of biological and toxin weapons.  These may conveniently be divided into two sets 
of contextual influences. 
 
Contextual influences endogenous to the BTWC.   
 
36.  The ongoing operation of the Convention continues, formally independent of the new 
process.  Systematic programmes of meetings beyond the 3 x 3 weeks' limit have been ruled 
out until 2006, but not other kinds of meeting for which the Convention, explicitly or as 
interpreted by earlier Review Conferences, already makes provision.   For example, further 
Consultative Meetings might be convened under the contingency mechanism of Article V, as 
invoked by Cuba in 1997.  Less likely, but also possible, is the bringing of a request for 
investigation to the Security Council under the complaint procedure of Article VI.  
 
                                                 
12United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November - 7 December 2001 and 11 - 22 November 2002, Final Report, 
BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002, paragraph 18 (e).  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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37.  Article V and Article VI procedures remain unaffected by the decision of 14 November 
2002.   But the use made of them, if any, will undoubtedly influence the implementation of 
the 14 November 2002 decision through the new process. 
 
Contextual influences exogenous to the BTWC.    
 
38.  Under this heading it may be noted that developments in the Australia Group and other 
plurilateral channels favoured by the United States (G-8, G-7 + Mexico, NATO) for 
coordinating export controls and countering bio-terrorist threats will influence the new 
process from outside the BTWC.  So, too, will the lessons learned from UNMOVIC activities 
in Iraq, from any other BW-related developments in the Middle East -- or North Korea --  
and, though unfortunately less likely, from any resumption, or replacement, of the long-
stalled Trilateral Process for establishing the magnitude and ensuring the complete 
abandonment of the former Soviet BW programme in the post-Soviet Russian Federation.  A 
future investigation by the United Nations Secretary-General of alleged BW use, under the 
long-established procedures for handling CBW allegations mandated by UN resolutions of 
1982 and 1988, would also impinge significantly on the way in which BTWC States Parties 
came to regard the threat posed by those weapons.  As would any use of BW whether by a 
State or by sub-State actors. Any of these events could prove to be a more powerful 
contextual influence on the new process than any developments within the BTWC itself. 
 
Conclusions 
 
39.  Other contextual influences may help prevent the fragmentation of the BTWC treaty 
regime.  For example, academic and NGO consortia could do much to keep a more synoptic, 
'whole-Convention'  perspective in view by running parallel events around the time of the 
meetings of States Parties in each year from 2003 to 2005.  This would complement their 
activity in feeding in specialist contributions to the meetings of experts, topic by topic, to the 
extent that their own expertise and the rules of procedure laid down by governments allow.  
Delegations confined strictly to the limited agenda of the new process in the meetings of 
States Parties for 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively would then have a wider forum in which 
to transcend the limitations imposed by the new process, and would be encouraged to take a 
wider view by meeting under academic-NGO auspices, possibly in conjunction with UNIDIR.  
Their handling of the factual report from the corresponding meeting of experts could well 
benefit from viewing it within the wider context of the BTWC treaty regime as a whole, and 
from the evidence of sustained interest on the part of academic and NGO specialists as 
representatives of 'civil society' concerned to uphold the Convention and strengthen its treaty 
regime alongside governments. 
 
40.  Furthermore, the kind of input made by academic specialists as in Key Points for the 
Fourth Review Conference (1996)13 and Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference (2001)14 
will be even more essential in the run-up to 2006, although it will need to take a different 
form in the light of (a) the hiatus in the cumulative review process represented by the Fifth 
Review Conference, and (b) the new process of 2003-2005. 
                                                 
13Graham S. Pearson & Malcolm R. Dando (eds), Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key 
Points for the Fourth Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies and QUNO 
Geneva, November 1996.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
14Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (eds), Strengthening the Biological Weapons 
Convention:  Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies 
and QUNO Geneva, November 2001.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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41.  But just as the International Committee of the Red Cross should not be expected to stand 
alone in reasserting the global norm against the deliberate spreading of disease, so non-
governmental 'friends of the Convention' should not be expected to carry the weight of 
sustaining the BTWC on their shoulders alone.  They can advise, encourage and warn.  They 
can continue to feed in a steady stream of policy proposals, research findings and original 
ideas to strengthen the treaty regime.    They can draw attention to its chronic institutional 
deficit, to the urgency for collective scrutiny of new developments in science and technology, 
to the desirability of agreed constraints on norm-threatening lines of research, to the need to 
enhance the transparency of biodefence programmes, and to the importance of States Parties 
doing all in their power to demonstrate compliance with all obligations flowing from the 
Convention -- and this list is by no means exhaustive.  They can help the States Parties to 
embark, once again, on an agenda for recovery. However, the Convention belongs to the 
States Parties and it is first and last their responsibility to uphold and strengthen it so that it 
works to the benefit of all. 
 
42.  In 2001 they failed to strengthen it by the Protocol route, and in 2002 they ducked out of 
their responsibility to review the operation of the Convention in relation to its purposes, or 
even explicitly to reaffirm the positions agreed at previous Review Conferences.  Most of 
them have a less than perfect record of submitting CBM returns in accordance with their 
politically-binding commitments of 1986 and 1991, reaffirmed in 1996.  A few -- and this is 
much more serious -- have allowed doubts to persist regarding their compliance with their 
fundamental obligations under Article I of the Convention.  Although it is one thing -- and it 
is useful, as the NAM did in their Ministerial Statement15 of 29 April 2002 -- to call upon 
States Parties to utilise the Article V procedures to address compliance concerns, States 
Parties should not neglect the benefits that would arise from their submitting a more 
comprehensive declaration under the CBMs which are, after all, specifically intended to 
"prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions".16 
 
43.  Collectively they have a lot of ground to make up.  The 2002 outcome was 
undistinguished.  It was only a (modest) success when compared with the even bleaker 
alternative: the prospect of complete failure which might have occurred upon the resumption 
of the Fifth Review Conference.  Now States Parties must exert every effort to get the 
evolution of the BTWC regime back on track.  The Sixth Review Conference must do more 
than mark a return to the review process proper: it must be enabled to examine the operation 
of the Convention in all its aspects, in relation to all its purposes, and to steer its constructive 
evolution onwards from 2006.  This requires much more information to be made available by 
States Parties between now and 2006, and properly collated and circulated: a kind of 'CBM-
plus' programme but extending much further into the realities of compliance assurance,  the 
realities of disease prevention and the realities of international cooperation in the peaceful 
applications of microbiology for the general good.   
 
44.   Some ad hoc meetings will be needed in order to maximise the chance of achieving 
these aims for 2006.  These meetings would be over and above the 3x3 weeks maximum 
                                                 
15Non-Aligned Movement, Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, 
Final Document, Durban, 29 April 2002, page 19, paragraph 77. Available at http://www. 
16United Nations, Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 9 - 27 September 1991, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.III/23, 1992, p.14, Article V 
section.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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allowed within the new multilateral process for meetings which are authorised by the Fifth 
Review Conference and will be serviced by the United Nations within the budgetary limits 
approved in 2002.17  Any ad hoc meetings will therefore require ad hoc financing and 
servicing, probably by a host government, which might receive financial contributions from 
like-minded governments to defray its costs. 
 
45.  For example, NAM states might organise ad hoc meetings to which all other States 
Parties might be invited in the light of the second 'understanding' in the NAM Statement18 of 
14 November 2002, namely that "The States Parties are sovereign and that as masters of 
their own fate they can together and at any time decide on further work that may be 
required."    
 
46.  Furthermore, there is nothing to prevent, and much to be said for, any State Party or 
group of like-minded States Parties organising an ad hoc meeting to which all other States 
Parties could be invited. 
 
47.  The emergence of a new 'like-minded group' spanning the NAM, Eastern and Western 
Groups will be particularly helpful in maximizing the benefits obtainable from the new 
multilateral process and in using it to promote a successful relaunch of the cumulative review 
process for the whole BTWC in 2006.  The European Union -- Latin America and Caribbean 
forum19 could well provide a nucleus for such a like-minded group especially if other States 
Parties such as Australia, New Zealand, Norwy, Canada, South Africa, the Republic of Korea 
and Japan were invited to participate in such a group.  Several Eastern Group members have 
associated themselves with European Union positions.  In addition, the Russian Federation 
made it clear in their statement20 following the resumed Fifth Review Conference that they 
intended to "actively participate" in the work of these fora together with "like-minded 
partners." Coordination of policy as well as procedure should be the aim, building on shared 
perceptions of the common interest while respecting the sovereignty of each State Party. 
 
48.  The new process of 2003-2005, if well handled, could well have a significant 
contribution to make to the strengthening of some parts of the BTWC,  within the limits of its 
five-topics agenda and provided that the ambiguities in that agenda are turned into 
opportunities.  If not well handled, by States Parties' governments making good use of it, the 
new process will remain an empty shell or fig leaf, as Ambassador Toth warned repeatedly on 
                                                 
17United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Estimated Costs of Meetings in 2003, 2004 and 2005 of the States Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
and on their Destruction: Note by the Secretariat, BWC/CONF.V/14, 13 November 2002, approved by the Fifth 
Review Conference at its ninth plenary session, 15 November 2002, BWC/CONF.V/17, paragraph 19. 
18Non-Aligned Movement and Other States, Statement on Behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other 
States, Note by the President, BWC/CONF.V/15, 18 November 2002.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
19See for example, European Union, EU - Latin America & the Caribbean Summit: Conclusions, EU - LAC 
Common values and Positions, 17 May 2002.  Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/lac/conc_en/ 
val_pos.htm 
20Russian Federation, On the Completion of the Second Part of the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological 
Weapons Convention, 2371-18-11-2002, Daily New Bulletin, 19 November 2002, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department.  Available at http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/eng 
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11 November 2002 when making his proposal public as a Draft Decision21 of the Fifth 
Review Conference. 
 
49.  NGOs, academic and other representatives of 'civil society' can properly supplement the 
work of the States Parties, not replace it.  They can provide a complement, not a substitute.  
That remains as true in the context of this new multilateral process for the BTWC in 2003-
2005 as in the better known context of its cumulative review process, which must be restored 
and taken forward in 2006. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21United Nations, Draft Decision of the Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
and on their Destruction, BWC/CONF.V/CRP.3, 6 November 2002. Available at http://www.opbw.org 
